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HUMANISM AND SCIENCE' 
Robert L. Sinsheimer** 
The most common view of the relation between humanism 
and science is that the two elements are antithetic. In my view 
humanism and science are complementary. And indeed I 
believe that in the last analysis each includes the other- 
which is not to say they are identical. But this antithetic view 
has a long and I suppose distinguished history dating back 
to virtually the very beginnings of moder science. 
One need only recall Blake's famous line 'May God us 
keep/from single vision/and Newton's sleep' through 
Wordsworth's 'Sweet is the lore which nature brings:/Our 
meddling intellect/Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things: 
-/We murder to dissect.' And on to Snow's two cultures and 
Roszak's critique of science as a 'monster of meaninglessness' 
and his distinction between information and knowledge or, 
as he calls it, gnosis. 
On the other side the attitude, I fear, has frequently been 
less one of antagonism than one of condescension-an 
attitude that the humanities were perhaps pleasant diver- 
sions, but irrelevant to the real issues of enduring impor- 
tance; that the humanities lack intellectual rigor and authen- 
ticity; even going so far as to say, in a quote attributed to 
Bronowski by Roszak, that the artistic response to nature is 
'a strangled, unformed and unfounded experience.' 
But what are the origins of these postures ? I do believe that 
there is a significant dichotomy in the perceptions of the 
practitioners of the two disciplines. The humanities and the 
sciences both represent projections of the human mind, ways 
in which the human mind seeks to encompass the human 
experience. But they emphasize quite distinct aspects of that 
experience. 
The humanists are concerned with the world of man and 
particularly with those qualities that are peculiarly human- 
speech and language and the associated arts of literature, 
drama, poetry, history; with the esthetic and the artistic and 
the visionary; with logic and reason and with the human gift 
of anticipation and its corollary burden of decision and value 
judgments; and with those feelings that are peculiarly human 
-compassion, hope, wonder and awe, doubt and grief and 
regret, rapture and love. 
On the other hand the sciences are concerned with the 
world of nature, and when they do consider man, they are 
then most interested in those aspects that link man to the rest 
of nature-to the world of physics and chemistry and 
particularly biology; that is, the sciences are concerned with 
man's most general qualities, not his specifically human 
qualities. 
Oddly, the humanities have almost never included science 
itself as a peculiarly human achievement. It is only very 
recently, and as yet very seldom, that historians have become 
interested in the history of science, that playwrights have 
found drama and conflict in the lives of scientists, that 
philosophers have pondered the logic of scientific discovery, 
that aesthetes have recognized the imagination and creative 
artistry in the scientific ordering of human experience, that 
essayists have been concerned with the effects of the social 
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milieu upon the origins and directions of science, that 
novelists have portrayed the human consequences of life in a 
technological society based upon principles incomprehen- 
sible to most men. 
It is also odd that the humanists are not yet keenly alert to 
the insights into the origins of human qualities that are 
beginning to emerge from the developments in the neuro- 
sciences, that those interested in aesthetics have not yet re- 
flected deeply on the significance of the specific modes of 
analysis of visual input common to primates, that the logi- 
cians have not yet reckoned with the limits to logic that may 
be imposed by the structures of the human brain. 
Perhaps, because the humanists focus upon the peculiarly 
human, it is not surprising that they eschew-and even 
resent being reminded of-man's biological bases. They 
resist and find distasteful the concept that we too, like other 
creatures, are in very considerable part the product of our 
genes; that our human faculties must arise in a programmed 
way in the development of each individual, and that these 
faculties must be the consequence of an evolutionary, pre- 
human history. 
From the beginning the humanists have deplored what 
they regard as the exaggerated emphasis which the practice 
of science confers upon one human quality-what we may 
call the cerebral, Newton's single vision; at the expense of 
other human qualities-the sensual, the aesthetic, the 
emotional, the visionary. 
And today when science and its child, technology, have in 
a seemingly inexorable manner become the driving forces, 
the engines of our social system, the concern of the humanists 
has enlarged from the purely intellectual arena to spread an 
alarm throughout society-to challenge the course upon 
which science and technology have subtly led us. 
The humanists warn of the dehumaninzation of man in the 
technological society through the glorification of certain 
qualities, the cerebral and the analytical, at theexpense of the 
emotional, the sensual, the holistic. They warn of the de- 
humanization of man through the estrangement of man from 
nature-his displacement from the natural environment in 
which man arose, to this technological society that seems to 
have its own imperatives for which man may or may not be 
adapted. 
They warn of the hubris of wielding powers beyond human 
scale, of the danger not only of overt nuclear catastrophe, or 
of the other 'white coat horrors'-the more subtle but 
foreseeable possibilities of a breach of the ozone layer, or the 
triggering of a new ice age, or the creation and escape of a 
lethal virus-but also of the hidden hazards latent in the 
burdens that a technology may place upon a society. They 
warn thus of the dangers in a nuclear technology that will 
produce wastes that must be sequestered for 25,000 years, an 
'unforgiving' technology that is woefully subject to sabo- 
tage or terrorist subversion. Indeed, from this perspective 
one can, for perhaps the first time, conceive the specific 
reality of the Faustian bargain-that science could indeed 
wholly innocently and inadvertently lead us into a deadly trap. 
The humanists warn, and it is most fitting that they do, of 
the possible consequences of scientific intervention in man 
himself. What may be the effects upon the peculiar qualities 
of man of behaviour modification, or more ultimately, of 
human genetic engineering? 
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The humanists thus challenge many of the trends of our 
time, and they place the responsibility for these dangerous 
courses upon a runaway science and technology, heedless of 
human values, deaf to the voices of despair. 
And what of science now in our time? What response do 
the scientists make to these charges ? Where does the scientist 
stand with respect to the human and social consequences of 
his work? The traditional posture of science has been that of 
a lofty reverence for knowledge for its own sake, with the 
implicit assumption that knowledge is preferable to igno- 
rance and with the faith that the net consequences will be 
beneficial. For most scientists, that is still the shield they 
raise. This posture may have flexed to some small degree, 
not so much with respect to science per se as with respect to 
technology, the application of science. Even this slight bend 
is grudging-in part, a consequence of self-discovery; 
in part, or persuasion; in part, perhaps, even of com- 
pulsion. 
By compulsion I mean simply that science has become 
expensive. And the scientist has been compelled to recognize 
that society must be persuaded, for one motive or another, 
that the support of science is worthwhile or else science will 
cease. By persuasion I simply mean that intellectually the 
alarms of the humanists cannot wholly be ignored. 
Most important, because most convincing, is the change 
in some degree in the self-image of the scientist himself-in 
his self-discovery. In part, it is a simple consequence of the 
fact that he too must live in the society his discoveries have 
helped to shape. In fact, of course, he is far better equipped 
than most to live in this society, for he understands more of 
the underlying principles of technology. But he too must 
endure pollution, he too must share the fear of sudden 
annihilation, his children too must cope with alienation and 
all the moral confusion engendered by swift change. 
And there is, in some quarters, a growing recognition that 
by the means of science the balance between man and nature 
has perceptibly shifted, so that once innocent human ideals 
boldly proclaimed in the age of human impotence are now 
seen to be less noble when, even partially, the ideal becomes 
reality. 
This is a curious and sobering twist. 
Even Francis Bacon would surely have wondered at this 
turn of events, though he saw most clearly the potential 
latent in science, the power inherent in what we would today 
call the disciplined imagination, trained to look back as well 
as forward, to test its vision again and again against estab- 
lished knowledge and designed experiment. Three and a half 
centuries ago, Bacon wrote: 'The roads to human power and 
human knowledge lie close together and are nearly the same.. 
Now the empire of man over things depends wholly on the 
arts and sciences for we cannot command nature except by 
obeying her.' 
As an aside, there is an interesting, implicit assumption in 
this statement. For Bacon it was clearly man's prerogative to 
'command' nature; he sought only the means. In this, of 
course, he was but an heir to the Western tradition upon 
which, in fact, he sought only to improve. A more passive 
life style-a life of coexistence within nature, as in the 
Taoist or Navajo tradition-would have been wholly 
foreign to him. 
In Bacon's time man's power 'over things' was so cruelly 
limited. Afflicted with plague, cursed by want choked with 
superstition, men must have felt that any increment of 
knowledge, any enlargement of human control over human 
destiny, seemed desirable-a change for the better. And 
Bacon foresaw science as the means to enlarge human 
knowledge and human power. In fairness, though, one must 
point out that the Baconian vision of the power of science, 
while wholly correct in principle, was far too limited in scale. 
He could, of course, hardly have conceived of hydrogen 
weapons or genetic engineering. 
Today, three and a half centuries later, we have achieved a 
deep understanding of, and very considerable control over, 
the natural universe. We have learned to command nature by 
obeying her. And today we are also learning that with com- 
mand comes responsibility and the necessity for choice. And 
the necessity for choice brings science abruptly to those 
issues with which the humanists have always been concerned 
-the definition and ordering of values. 
Today we have, increasingly, choices to make about the 
introduction and the directions of our ever-changing tech- 
nologies. And thus we have need of the knowledge and in- 
sight and wisdom of the humanists to help to guide those 
choices. In retrospect we can see that our continuing Bacon- 
ian compulsion to introduce technical and social change has 
stretched the very fabric of our society and thereby exposed 
the concealed, yet unhealed, divisions-the ancient and 
continuing social faults that had been discreetly papered over, 
the sores of imperialism and racism, and economic injustice. 
We can see that very likely particular technologies are 
better adapted to particular forms of social structure. In the 
past, we have perforce adapted our social structure to the 
available technologies. Can we now begin with our wealth of 
knowledge to reverse this pattern, to construct technologies 
suited to the society in which we wish to live and the kind of 
man we wish to be ? 
Or are we, again, naive ? Do we really have the freedom on 
this small planet to choose our technology? Is there a tech- 
nological imperative, an innate entelechy that determines the 
course of technological evolution for which men are the un- 
witting pawns, much as the cells in a developing organism? 
But at least a few scientists can see that we will need all of 
the wisdom we can muster. Indeed, we have so long been 
committed to the doctrine that change is, per se, good that 
we lack even the social agencies to brake or divert change. If, 
as an instance, we should decide that we do not wish at this 
time to exacerbate our existing social tensions with the intro- 
duction of a new technology, such as human genetic en- 
gineering with its imperative of difficult and divisive new 
value judgments, how could we divert it? If we choose to defer 
this technology, to what time? If we wish to ban this tech- 
nology, how would we do so, globally-and at what social 
and spiritual cost to science and to all intellectual zest? 
We need humane wisdom if we are to find noncata- 
strophic solutions to our growing dilemmas. We cannot 
simply abandon our technological craft-our life-support 
systems. Our very food and water and warmth depend upon 
them; there is no going back. Nor really, would we, if we 
could. Without science and technology we would still be 
living in the 17th century. Would anyone really take that 
return trip ? Science has brought us wonderful, if troubling, 
illuminations. Technology has brought us great freedoms, 
even if it has also brought new torments. Agreed, we cannot 
continue simply to rely upon more technology to cure the 
evils of today's technology. We need the insight of the 
humanists. But also we must have the elixir of science and 
the thrust of technology. 
While there are many points of contact between the 
humanities and the sciences, human genetic engineering is 
their direct intersection. The mere possibility of such a 
technology presents clear imperatives to both disciplines. The 
humanist must finally recognize that many of our peculiarly 
human qualities are, in fact, shaped by our genes-yes, by 
those tiny molecules, that were in turn shaped by eons of 
evolution. And the scientists must finally recognize that to 
reshape man is not a beguiling laboratory experiment, but an 
enterprise that involves the ultimate exercise in value 
judgment. It is to fuse means and ends; it is to test the validity 
of all values. To use our heritage to change our heritage is to 
take the full responsibility for human destiny. The potential 
of human genetic engineering will draw science into the 
mainstream of the humanities and the humanities into the 
mainstream of science-a most fateful union. 
If we need, somehow, to blend the humanities and the 
sciences to cope with the problems of the modern world, 
how shall we go about it? How can we train individuals to 
be perceptive of the best of both disciplines ? I will not pre- 
sume to answer for the humanists. From my side I would ask, 
how can we train scientists to be concerned not only with 
science itself but also with the definition of the proper role of 
science in the human adventure? How can the scientist, 
necessarily deeply committed to his own work, learn to stand 
back from that work-to see that the world of science is not 
all-embracing but is one world, contiguous to other worlds? 
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To see that the scientist is one facet of the human being and 
to see the relation of the world of science to those other 
worlds? To stand back and see that science exists because 
man-alone, so far as we know, among the animals-has the 
capacity to create within his cerebral cortex detailed repre- 
sentations of his external world, as he perceives it, and to 
rearrange these representations in varied modes? To see 
that man presumably acquired this odd talent because of the 
advantage it gave him in the projection of future circum- 
stances, an obvious aid to adaptation and survival? 
And to see then that the price of this capacity, the price of 
imagination itself, is the potential for distortion, for self- 
deception, even for hallucination? And that Bacon outlined 
science then as a reflective art-as a social compact to lead 
us, through the regimen of experiment, to a single, com- 
munal, openly validated perception of the universe? And to 
see that science is in this sense in some ways like a religion, 
it requires of its faithful a self-abnegation, a submission of 
one's individual idiosyncratic view of the universe into the 
single common, cumulative perception? 
This is the way the world is. No less-and no more. 
But then also to see that science cannot deny the human 
value of other perceptions of the universe within the human 
cerebral cortex-of the aesthetic perception or the moral 
perception or even the fictional perception, if they are 
recognized as such ? 
No scientist, only an artist, could produce fantasies that 
delight us by the rearrangement of the real world (Fig. 1). 
No scientist, only leaders with great moral insight, could 
have devised the basis of our Judeo-Christian ethics. 
Nor should science claim even its own perfection, for 
science is self-evidently a human creation. Science exists in 
the human mind, and one thing we do know that Bacon 
could not is that the universe is far more complex than even 
the human brain. We do marvelously well with our ab- 
stractions and our generalizations of reality, but the true 
external complexity surely greatly exceeds our inherited 
cranial capacity. 
But do we train our scientist thus ? Alas, not so. It is true 
that our great schools of science and technology pay lip 
service to the humanities but not much more. At the Cali- 
fornia Institute of Technology (Caltech) it is loosely said 
that each student must devote 20 percent of his course time to 
the humanities, but in fact only one-fourth of that need be in 
the humanities per se. The remainder can be, for example, 
economics, social science, or anthropology-all valuable in 
themselves, but not truly the humanities in outlook. 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), by 
virtue of its size and stature, is surely a leading symbol of 
science and technology. And it has often expressed its 
recognition of the significance of the humanities. But it is 
interesting to read what William Irwin Thompson, who did 
time at MIT, writes in his widely acclaimed book, At the 
Edge of History: 'What distinguished MIT from any other 
university was not its science but its overwhelming lust for 
power ... When men are trained to strive for power over their 
environment they are socially constrained to achieve that 
success through suppression of consciousness in which 
ambiguity, complexity, feeling, intuition and imagination are 
dismissed as irrelevant distractions .... 
'The humanist at MIT thus finds himself in a situation that 
is no doubt prophetic of the condition of the citizen in the 
technological society of A.D. 2000. To the degree that the 
humanist succeeds in technologizing the humanities (by 
turning them into the social sciences), he destroys the hu- 
manities; to the degree that he ignores the technological 
world and teaches as one might at Cardinal Newman's 
Oxford, he insures the conviction in his students' minds that 
the humanities are simply irrelevant o the mastery of our new 
complex society; to the degree that he succeeds in communi- 
cating the relevance of the traditional humanities to our 
society, he finds himself welcomed by the administration as 
valuable camouflage, and resented by his students, who 
correctly point our that while he makes a great noise, he is 
still powerless to affect the inhumane training of the whole 
Institute. The naive humanist thinks that in teaching the 
humanities to MIT students he is helping a major American 
institution deal with the problems of our civiliztion, but it 
does not take long for the students to educate the teacher to 
see that the Institute is, as Eldridge Cleaver would say, not 
part of the solution, but part of the problem.' 
I do not know how just this trenchant critique may be, but 
it is of great interest as a humanist's reaction to a great 
technical institute. (In Technology Review for May 1975, 
Bruce Mazlish, the new head of the humanities department 
at MIT, presented an alternative: 'Another role ... is for the 
Department to become integrated into the full intellectual life 
and work of the Institute, to become involved with the 
people in engineering and science in trying to understand 
problems that are related to the creation of a new kind of 
world by science and technology . . . in some ways, in the 
future the only way you'll be able to do good science or 
Fig. 2. View of the Earth from the Moon 
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technology is by having a very keen awareness of the hu- 
manistic and social science component.)' 
Thompson, however, has a real point. The problem is, if I 
may borrow a term from the social scientists, one of 'role 
models.' It would do little good simply to inject more re- 
quired humanities courses into the Caltech or MIT curricula. 
The student comes to Caltech or MIT to become a scientist or 
engineer; his models, then, are inevitably the great scientists 
and engineers who are his mentors. If they ignore the 
humanities-if they, as they do, make it clear that pure 
physics, or chemistry or biology or mathematics, is the real 
focus of interest and the locus of importance, then all the 
wisdom of the humanists will leave scant imprint. To impress 
the student with the importance of nonscience he must see 
that his role models are concerned with nonscience. The 
questions of the social consequences of science and tech- 
nology, the issues of choice and values, must be brought into 
the physics and chemistry and biology classrooms so that as 
the student learns the physics of splitting the atom, he also 
ponders the social correlates of nuclear fission. And as he 
learns the principles of genetics, he also learns of the reality 
of environmental mutagens and ponders the significance of 
innate human diversity. 
1 do not pretend that I know how to bring this about- 
but I do believe that we need sorely to develop an educational 
style that will prepare our best students to cope with the 
problems of whether and which, as well as how. When we 
have accomplished that, perhaps we will see more clearly the 
relation between science and humanities that I feel is depicted 
in the famous photograph from Apollo 8 of our earth rising 
over the lunar horizon (Fig. 2). 
Here, the power of science has provided us with a simple, 
dramatic confirmation of the ancient humanist vision of the 
common bond, the common solitude, the common destiny 
of all mankind on this small Eden floating in the vastness of 
space. 
The vision of the scientist need not eclipse that of the 
humanist-nor vice versa. Rather they should complement 
and reinforce each other as we find our way into the future. 
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